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INTRODUCTION 
There are few cases that inform our collective understanding of the 
American jury system more than Batson v. Kentucky.1 This case serves as a 
touchstone in Equal Protection jurisprudence and can be viewed as "the 
[U.S. Supreme Court's] most ambitious attempt to impose meaningful 
prohibitions on the use of race-based peremptory challenges."2 This case 
and its progeny provide a framework for the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause3 and also implicate the Sixth 
Amendment's4 jury-trial guarantees. 
The Batson holding has been expanded to guard not only against the 
wrongful exclusion of jurors based upon race, but also against improper 
exclusions based upon gender and ethnicity.5 It remains to be seen whether 
the Court will expand the Batson rationale to include exclusions based upon 
either sexual orientation6 or religion. 7 Despite these expansions, however, 
1. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
2. Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and Discrimination in 
Jury Selection, 66 Mo. L. REV. 279, 284 (2007). 
3. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
4. The Sixth Amendment states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see generally Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth 
Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501 (1986) (advocating for an 
analysis of race-based peremptory challenges under the Sixth Amendment instead of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
5. See].E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994) (discussing prohibitions 
against jury exclusions based upon gender). The Court noted that "intentional discrimination 
on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where, as 
here, the discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad 
stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women." Id.; see also Hernandez v. New York, 
500 U.S. 352, 375 (1991) (plurality opinion) (affirming the exclusion of bilingual potential 
jurors but implicitly recognizing that Batson prohibits exclusions based upon ethnicity). 
6. See generally John J. Neal, Striking Batson Gold at the End of the Rainbow?: Revisiting 
Batson v. Kentucky and Its Progeny in Light o/Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, 91 IOWA L. 
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even the original goals articulated twenty years ago in Batson remain 
unfulfilled. Batson's promise of protection against racially discriminatory jury 
selection has not been realized. While the Batson majority proclaimed, "The 
Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not 
exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, or on 
the false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to 
serve as jurors,"8 the challenges posed by cases such as Snyder v. State,9 a case 
with a deep racial history, belie the achievement of these lofty aspirations. 
Certainly, the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Snyder v. Louisiana10 
revealed that the Court would rather whitewash its Batson analysis than 
engage in a robust examination of the racialized circumstances and issues of 
racism present in, and revealed by, such a case. The Court thereby missed an 
opportunity to grapple with one of the criminal:iustice system's most 
pressing and enduring concerns-race. 
Many commentators have analyzed the racialized nature of the 
American criminal:iustice system.11 Protection of the American jury system 
REV. 1091 (2006) (arguing that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence should lead to the 
prohibition of sexual-orientation based peremptory challenges). 
7. See Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1115-16 (1992) (Ginsburg,]., concurring in the 
denial of certiorari) (reiterating the distinctions drawn by the lower court between race, gender, 
and religion-specifically, how one's religion is not necessarily self-evident and often can only 
be discerned with probing); see also United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 
1989) (upholding a conviction where the prosecutor indicated that he had struck a juror not 
because of his race but due to his religion), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2623 (1990). 
8. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (internal citations omitted). 
9. State v. Snyder (Snyder II), 942 So. 2d 484 (La. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008). 
10. Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1203. 
11. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 5-7 (1999) (arguing that the "criminal justice system affirmatively depends on 
inequality" and that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding search and seizure, the right 
to counsel, jury selection, sentencing, and prosecutorial discretion has enabled race and class to 
affect the criminal:iustice system deeply). See generally, e.g., ANGELA]. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: 
THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007) ( discussing racial disparities in the charging, 
plea bargaining, and sentencing phases of the criminal:iustice system and noting the vast power 
wielded by local and federal prosecutors); DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL 
PROFILING CANNOT WORK (2002) (analyzing the use of racial profiling and how the discretion 
afforded to police officers perpetuates racial profiling in the criminal:iustice system); RANDALL 
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997) (exploring the meaning of race within criminal-
law contexts such as the jury-selection process, presumptions of criminal propensity, 
victimization, and punishment); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, 
WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARAssMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 
(1998) (discussing the way that media portrayals, historical legal discrimination, discriminatory 
treatment of blacks by police, and racial hoaxes manifest a racially unjust criminal:iustice 
system); Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and Gender 
Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 531 (1997) (using constitutive 
ethnography to analyze prosecutors' decisions in sexual-assault cases and concluding that 
characterizations of race, along with gender and geographical location, influence decisions to 
pursue cases); Bonita R. Gardner, Separate and Unequal: Federal Tough-On-Guns Program Targets 
Minority Communities for Selective Enforcement, 12 MICH.]. RACE & L. 305 (2007) (arguing that the 
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from race-based inequities has been an essential part of jurisprudential 
attempts at fairness, justice, and equity. Indeed, the aspiration for an 
impartial administration of the jury system has been the subject of numerous 
Supreme Court opinions as well as a popular topic of scholarly analysis. 12 
federal government's Project Safe Neighborhoods program, which aggressively enforces 
firearms laws, is disparately and discriminatorily enforced against African-Americans); Chris 
Chambers Goodman, The Color of Our Character: Confronting the Racial Character of Rule 404(b) 
Evidence, 25 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2007) (arguing that Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is 
frequently used unfairly to admit character and propensity evidence that allows or encourages 
jurors to make racist or stereotypical inferences); Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a 
Means of Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19 (2007) ( discussing 
racial disparities in the criminal:iustice system and recommending that policymakers consider 
racial-impact statements that discuss the potential racial effects of proposed laws or policies in 
order to reduce these disparities); Steven R. Morrison, Will to Power, Will to Reality, and Racial 
Profiling: How the White Male Dominant Power Structure Creates Itself as Law Abiding Citizen Through 
the Creation of Black as Criminal, 2 Nw. J.L. & Soc. PoL'Y 63 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court's criminal-procedure decisions in Terry v. Ohio, Whren v. United States, Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, and Florida v. Bostick gave rise to a construction of whites as law abiding and blacks 
as criminal); Charles]. Ogletree,Jrc, Black Man's Burden: Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81 
OR. L. REV. 15, 33 (2002) ("[T]he undervaluation of black life ... is seen in the grossly racially 
disproportionate way in which our entire system of criminal justice operates. These racial 
differences occur at every stage of criminal processing, from arrest, prosecution, and jury 
selection to trial conduct, sentencing, and parole."). 
12. See generally Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) (holding that the prosecution's 
use of peremptory challenges to strike ten qualified black venire members, along with shuffiing 
the venire to avoid black potential jurors and asking different questions of black and white 
prospective jurors, was sufficient evidence to warrant the grant of federal habeas corpus relief); 
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that intentional discrimination on 
the basis of gender by state actors in the use of peremptory strikes in jury selection violates the 
Equal Protection Clause); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (holding that a white defendant 
has standing to raise an equal-protection claim against systematic jury exclusion of blacks 
because the excluded jurors and criminal defendants have a common interest in eliminating 
racial discrimination from the courtroom); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding 
that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely 
on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable to 
consider impartially the State's case against a black defendant); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 
(1986) (holding that a defendant accused of an interracial capital crime is entitled to have 
prospective jurors informed of the victim's race and questioned on the issue of racial bias); 
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (holding that a Missouri jury-selection provision 
allowing women to opt out of jury duty resulted in an unconstitutionally disproportionate 
exclusion of women and violated the defendant's constitutional right to a jury composed of a 
fair cross section of the community); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976) (holding that a 
defendant has no right to ask on voir dire if a juror believes that whites are more trustworthy 
than blacks); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause requires a trial judge, on voir dire, to interrogate jurors about 
racial prejudice after a defendant's timely request therefor); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) 
(holding that a defendant convicted of murder and sentenced to death was denied a fair trial 
through the denial of change of venue because heavy publicity of the defendant's alleged 
confession to notorious crimes resulted in deep jury bias that could not be overcome by voir 
dire); COLE, supra note 11, at 101-31 (1999) (discussing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence 
regarding race in jury-pool composition and petit:iury selection and arguing that its decisions 
have not eliminated racial bias in jury selection); Joseph A. Colquitt, Using Jury Questionnaires; 
(Ab)using Jurors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2007) (analyzing the use of different types of jury 
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Given the Court's reluctance to explore peremptory challenges under 
the rubric of the Sixth Amendment, 13 the Fourteenth Amendment is the 
exclusive jurisprudential lens for analysis. As discussed earlier, the Supreme 
Court and numerous legal commentators have highlighted the fact that 
defendants of color must receive a jury of their peers, reinforced the 
illegality of governmental discrimination on account of race, and focused 
upon prosecutorial misbehavior. 14 Despite these aspirations, however, the 
questionnaires and suggesting that jury questionnaires should be more limited and narrowly 
tailored); Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn Broschard, The Silent Criminal Defendant and the Presumption 
of Innocence: In the Hands of Real Jurors, ls Either of Them Safe?, IO LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 237 
(2006) (using surveys of real jurors to consider whether jurors understand and follow jury 
instructions and contending that the Supreme Court's irrebuttable presumption that jurors do 
so violates the Due Process Clause, as interpreted by the Court's own jurisprudence); Sheri 
Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985) (discussing social 
science data illustrating that white juries are more likely to convict black defendants than white 
defendants and proposing an equal-protection argument that would recognize the social 
science data as proof of purposeful discrimination); Dean Sanderford, The Sixth Amendment, 
Rule 606(b), and the Intrusion into Jury Deliberations of Religious Principles of Decision, 74 TENN. L. 
REV. 167 (2007) (advocating limited admission of jurors' testimony regarding the role that 
religious beliefs played in the jury's deliberations as a way to guarantee the Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial trial); Natasha Azava, Note, Disability-Based Peremptory Challenge: Need for 
Elimination, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS j. 121 (2006) (arguing that the use of 
peremptory challenges based on disability should be prohibited just like the peremptory 
challenge based on race and gender). 
13. In Holland v. Illinois, the Court stated: 
We reject petitioner's fundamental thesis that a prosecutor's use of peremptory 
challenges to eliminate a distinctive group in the community deprives the 
defendant of a Sixth Amendment right to the "fair possibility" of a representative 
jury .... It has long been established that racial groups cannot be excluded from 
the venire from which a jury is selected. That constitutional principle was first set 
forth not under the Sixth Amendment but under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478--79 (1990). 
14. See generally Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 231 (holding that the prosecution's use of peremptory 
challenges to strike ten qualified black venire members, shuffling the venire to avoid black 
potential jurors, and asking different questions of black and white prospective jurors was 
sufficient evidence to warrant granting federal habeas corpus relief); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 
400 (1991) (holding that a white defendant has standing to raise an equal-protection claim 
based on the systematic jury exclusion of blacks because the excluded juror and the criminal 
defendant share the common interest of eliminating racial discrimination from the 
courtroom); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids a prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the 
assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable to impartially consider the State's case 
against a black defendant); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 75 (1954) (holding that evidence 
supported the finding that persons of Mexican descent were a separate class, distinct from 
whites, and reversing a Hispanic defendant's murder conviction because Hispanics were 
systematically excluded from both the grand and petit juries); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U.S. 303 (1880) (striking down a state statute expressly allowing only white men to serve as 
jurors as an unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause, though noting that a 
defendant is not entitled to a jury composed in whole or part of persons of his same race); 
COLE, supra note 11, at 126 ("lf the criminal justice system is to be accepted by the black 
community, the black community must be represented on juries. The long history of excluding 
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hope of Batson v. Kentucky15 remains unfulfilled due in part to the ease with 
which a prosecutor may overcome a defendant's showing of a prima facie 
case of purposeful discrimination in the jury-selection process, and also due 
to the narrow framework courts employ when examining racially motivated 
behaviors. 16 Specifically, challenges brought against the discriminatory use 
of peremptory challenges are too easily explained away because there is 
insufficient critical thought involved in the assessment of the exercise of this 
prosecutorial discretion. 
This Article will explore the case of Snyder v. Louisiana17 as an example 
of the low threshold established by some jurisdictions that apply the Batson 
test. By allowing for pretext, inconsistent excuses, and flimsy explanations 
from prosecutors, many courts have essentially inoculated prosecutors from 
the rigorous potential of the Batson decision. Part I briefly reviews the 
landmark decision of Batson v. Kentucky to reveal the unrealized scope of this 
legal opinion. Part II explores Snyder and analyzes both the prosecutors' use 
of peremptory challenges to achieve an all-white jury as well as the repeated 
remarks of one prosecutor who invoked the racially polarizing OJ. Simpson 
case. Part III uses sociological theories of raced-based perception to examine 
the racial divisions prompted by the OJ. Simpson case. This subsection 
draws the connection between the likely manner in which an all-white jury 
would view the OJ. verdict and its relevance to establishing both 
discriminatory intent on the part of the prosecutors and the absence of 
neutral explanations for prosecutorial removal of all of the black jurors from 
Mr. Snyder's jury. In the conclusion, I suggest that the Supreme Court 
decision is under-theorized because it fails to address the larger issues of 
race and ethics so clearly at play in the case. I urge, instead, the adoption of 
a more critical and reality-based framework for the scrutiny of Batson 
challenges, or alternatively, the abolition of peremptory challenges with 
respect to capital murder cases. 
blacks from juries is one important reason why blacks ... are more skeptical than whites about 
the fairness of the criminal justice system."); James Forman, Jr., juries and Race in the Nineteenth 
Century, 113 YALE LJ. 895 (2004) (discussing the historical exclusion of blacks on juries, the 
unjust treatment that black defendants received from all-white juries, and abolitionists' decades-
long efforts to achieve black participation in the legal and jury processes); Stephen E. Reil, Who 
Gets Counted? Jury List Representativeness for Hispanics in Areas with Growing Hispanic Populations 
Under Duren v. Missouri, 2007 BYU L. REV. 201 (noting that Hispanics are more likely to be 
incarcerated than whites and proposing methods for adequately representing Hispanics on jury 
venires to ensure the satisfaction of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial trial and the 
Duren v. Missouri fair-cross-section standard). 
15. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89--98. 
16. See generally David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder 
Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA.]. CONST. L. 3 (2001) (providing a comprehensive 
overview and empirical examination of the use of peremptory challenges in Philadelphia death 
penalty cases over the course of approximately two decades). 
17. State v. Snyder (Snyder II), 942 So. 2d 484 (La. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008). 
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I. THE LEGACY OF BATSON 
Mr. Batson, a black man, was indicted for second-degree burglary and 
the receipt of stolen property in Kentucky. 18 After certain jurors were 
excused for cause, the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to 
construct an all-white jury by striking all four of the black people on the 
venire. 19 The defense counsel sought to discharge the jury as violative of 
Batson's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a jury "drawn from a 
cross section of the community"20 and of guarantees to equal protection of 
the laws.21 Rejecting these submissions, the trial judge held that "the parties 
were entitled to use their peremptory challenges to 'strike anybody they 
want to."' 22 
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Powell firmly situated 
Batson as following in the footsteps of the Court's decision in Swain v. 
Alabama.23 Swain, a case decided over two decades prior to Batson, involved a 
black defendant sentenced to death upon conviction, by an all-white jury, of 
raping a white woman. Robert Swain, then eighteen years old, mounted his 
appeals based not upon the historically rooted, yet controversial, allegations 
of rape made against black men accused of raping white women,24 nor upon 
the equally controversial use of the death sentence to execute black 
defendants accused of harming white victims.25 Rather, his articulations 
18. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82. 
19. Id. at 82-83. 
20. Id. at 83. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. (quoting the trial judge). 
23. Justice Powell stated, "This case requires us to reexamine that portion of Swain v. 
Alabama concerning the evidentiary burden placed on a criminal defendant who claims that he 
has been denied equal protection through the State's use of peremptory challenges to exclude 
members of his race from the petitjury." Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 (internal citation omitted). 
24. See, e.g., N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Beys, and the Myth of the 
Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1333-38 (2004) (relating the facts of the 1931 
Scottsboro Boys cases in which nine black youths were falsely accused of raping two white 
women on a train, a mob called for their lynchings, their trials were blatantly racist and unfair, 
and eventually one of the white women admitted that neither of them had been raped at all); 
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Lynching, 21 LAW & INEQ. 263, 
276--80 (2003) (discussing the lynching of black men following accusations of raping white 
women in the twentieth century); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History 
of, and Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-ofVictim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. LJ. 1, 1 (2006) 
(contending that the criminal:iustice system systematically undervalues rapes of black women 
and overvalues rapes of white women, resulting in racism in rape prosecutions); Jennifer 
Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 103, 105 (1983) (noting that during 
the slavery era, black men convicted of raping white women were frequently sentenced to death 
or castration). 
25. See COLE, supra note 11, at 132 ("As of June 1998, only ... [seven] white men had been 
executed in the United States for killing black victims. In the same 1976-1998 period, 115 black 
men were executed for killing white victims."); ANGELA]. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER 
OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 81 (2007) (noting that "the death penalty was sought far more 
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were based entirely upon the racialized use of the jury system in Talladega 
County. 
The substance of Swain's appeal revolved around three issues. First, he 
challenged the construction of the jury panels in criminal cases-including 
the jury roll, grand juries, and petit juries-claiming that the disparities 
indicated racial discrimination.26 Second, Swain claimed that the prosecutor 
intentionally struck all six blacks from the petit jury in order to achieve an 
all-white jury.27 As such, Swain averred that the exclusion of black people 
from serving on his petit jury was designedly discriminatory. Third, Swain 
critiqued the manner in which prosecutors in Talladega County had 
perverted the peremptory strike system to exclude blacks systematically from 
ever serving on petitjuries.28 
Remarkably, the Court denied the appeal and affirmed the lower 
court's determinations on not one, not two, but all three bases of Swain's 
appeai.29 Because "Alabama ha[d] not totally excluded [blacks] from either 
grand or petitjury panels,"30 and because the inclusion of between six and 
eight blacks on these panels did not rise to the level of "forbidden token 
inclusion,"31 the Court held insufficient the evidence claimed "to make out a 
prima facie case of invidious [racial] discrimination [in violation of] the 
Fourteenth Amendment."32 Further, the Court determined that, because 
"Negro and white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject to being 
frequently in cases involving black defendants and white victims ... [ than] cases involving white 
defendants and black victims" and attributing these disparities in part to the prosecutor's broad 
charging power); Ogletree, supra note 11, at 33. Oglteree wrote: 
[T]he undervaluation of black life if not just evident in our capital sentencing 
rates, but is seen in the grossly racially disproportionate way in which our entire 
system of criminal justice operates .... These racial differences occur at every 
stage of criminal processing, from arrest, prosecution, and jury selection to trial 
conduct, sentencing, and parole. 
Id.; see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1987). The Court discussed the 
conclusions of Professor David C. Baldus's 1970 study, which found that "the death penalty was 
assessed in 22% of cases involving black defendants and white victims; 8% of the cases involving 
white defendants and white victims; 1 % of the cases involving black defendants and black 
victims; and 3% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims" and that "black 
defendants ... who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death 
penalty." Id. at 286-87. Note that the Court declined to consider the Baldus study sufficient 
evidence of discriminatory purpose to find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and 
upheld the defendant's death sentence. 
26. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205-09 (1965). 
27. Id. at 209-22. 
28. Id. at 222-28. 
29. Id. at 205-28. 
30. Id. at 206. 
31. Swain, 380 U.S. at 206. 
32. Id. 
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challenged without cause,"33 opening peremptory challenges up to "the 
demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause" would 
essentially eviscerate the nature and purpose of the challenge.34 The Court 
thus decided that the striking of blacks in a particular case was not a 
violation of equal protection.35 Finally, with respect to the assertion that 
Alabama was systematically striking blacks from petit juries, the Court again 
rejected Swain's arguments, stating that "even if a State's systematic striking 
of Negroes in the selection of petit juries raises a prima facie case under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, we think it is readily apparent that the record in 
this case is not sufficient to demonstrate that the rule has been violated."36 
The Supreme Court in Swain affirmed the death sentence by stating that 
"petitioner has not laid the proper predicate for attacking the peremptory 
strikes as they were used in this case."37 
Batson both adopted and rejected these Swain rationales. The Supreme 
Court recognized that part of the Swain decision acknowledged that a 
'"State's purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of 
participation as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal 
Protection Clause."'38 The key issue to be resolved in Batson, however, was 
the manner and level of proof required to claim such a constitutional 
violation successfully. As such, the Court in Batson embarked upon an 
evidentiary journey, remarking that "[a] recurring question in these cases, as 
in any case alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, was whether 
the defendant had met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination on 
the part of the State."39 
The Court in Batson, however, broke from the Swain Court's higher 
evidentiary threshold stating that "[s]ince [lower court] interpretation[s] of 
Swain ha[ve] placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof[,] ... we 
reject [Swain's] evidentiary formulation."40 Importantly, central to the Swain 
Court's rejection of the claim of the racially discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges was the Court's granting of a presumption of fairness 
and impartiality in favor of the prosecutor.41 
The Swain Court reasoned that "[t]he presumption in any particular 
case must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a 
fair and impartial jury [before whom] to try the case."42 The Court further 
33. Id. at 221. 
34. Id. at 221-22. 
35. Id. at 222. 
36. Swain, 380 U.S. at 224. 
37. Id. at 226. 
38. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 203--04). 
39. Id. at 90. 
40. Id. at 92-93. 
41. Swain, 380 U.S. at 222-23. 
42. Id. at 222. 
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decided that "it is permissible to insulate from inquiry the removal of 
Negroes from a particular jury on the assumption that the prosecutor is 
acting on acceptable considerations."43 This was a high standard, indeed, as 
"the presumption protecting the prosecutor may ... be overcome" where 
"the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in a criminal 
case."44 
Thus, in rejecting Swain's systematic-exclusion rationale, the Batson 
Court noted that it had resulted in an impossible situation as "a black 
defendant could make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination 
on proof that the peremptory challenge system as a whole was 'being 
perverted. "'45 Clearly, this test, as Robert Swain found out, was likely 
insurmountable given the resources of defendants and the fact that only 
prosecutors had access to certain information. At bottom, the Swain test 
required a defendant to take a bird's-eye view of the manner in which 
prosecutors were exercising peremptory challenges. The Supreme Court 
later held this systematic focus beyond the use of peremptory challenges in 
the specific defendant's case to be inappropriate.46 
In rejecting this structural approach as inconsistent with constitutional 
standards of equal protection, the Batson Court held that "a defendant may 
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the 
petit jury solely on evidence concerning the . . . [use] of peremptory 
challenges at the defendant's trial."47 This purview-focusing upon the 
construction of the defendant's case-was an important modification that 
allows for consideration of prosecutorial behavior from the start of the trial 
process until the trial's conclusion as informing the use of peremptory 
challenges. 
Further, the Court in Batson reiterated its centuries-old position that a 
"State denies a black defendant equal protection of the laws when it puts 
him on trial before a jury from which members of his race have been 
43. Id. at 223. 
44. Id. at 224. 
45. Batson, 476 U.S. at 91 (emphasis added). 
46. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The Batson Court held: 
A number of lower courts following the teaching of Swain reasoned that proof of 
repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases was necessary to establish a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Since this interpretation of Swain has 
placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, prosecutors' peremptory 
challenges are now largely immune from constitutional scrutiny. For reasons that 
follow, we reject this evidentiary formulation as inconsistent with standards that 
have been developed since Swain for assessing a prima fade case under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986). 
47. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. 
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purposefully excluded."48 In emphasizing one of the constitutional prongs 
under which the peremptory process should be evaluated, the Court 
recognized that it is governmental racial discrimination when black citizens 
are excluded from jury service, and that such governmental activity was "a 
primary example of the evil the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to 
cure."49 
Harkening to the Sixth Amendment, however, the Court in Batson also 
alluded to the preeminent purpose of the jury system. Quoting from their 
decision in the landmark case of Strauder v. West Virgi,nia,50 the Court in 
Batson reasoned that '" [ t] he very idea of a jury is a body ... composed of the 
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to 
determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the 
same legal status in society as that which he holds. "'51 Therefore, to 
discriminate intentionally on the basis of race in the selection of a jury of a 
defendant's peers is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because it 
denies the very "protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure."52 
Indeed, "to perform its intended function as a check on official power, it 
must be a body drawn from the community."53 The Batson Court recognized 
that by "compromising the representative quality of the jury," prosecutors 
could easily use juries as weapons for the oppression of "'unpopular or 
inarticulate minorities. "'54 
For these reasons, the Batson Court firmly reasserted that "the State's 
privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges, is 
subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause."55 Further, the 
Equal Protection Clause prevents the exclusion of qualified citizens from 
jury service solely on the basis of race or assumed racial biases.56 With these 
dictates in place, the Court in Batson returned to the consideration of the 
evidentiary requirements to establish a violation. 
48. Id. at 85 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) ). The Court also stated 
that "(t]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not exclude 
members of his race from the jury venire on account of race or on the false assumption that 
members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as jurors." Id. at 86 (citation and 
footnote omitted). 
49. Id. at 85. 
50. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 303. 
51. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308). 
52. Id.; see also id. at 8~7 ("[T]hose on the venire must be indifferently chosen to secure 
the defendant's right under the Fourteenth Amendment to protection of life and liberty against 
race or color prejudice." (internal quotation omitted)). The Court further references its 
decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), stating that "a defendant's right to be 
tried by a jury of his peers is designed 'to prevent oppression by the Government.'" Id. at 87 
(quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155). 
53. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. 
54. Id. (quoting Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398,408 (1945) (Murphy J., dissenting)). 
55. Id. at 89. 
56. Id. 
1698 93 IOWA LAW REVIEW [2008] 
Ultimately, the Batson Court recognized that the systemic evidentiary 
requirement in Swain was virtually impossible for a defendant to satisfy. It 
commented that "[s]ince this interpretation of Swain has placed on 
defendants a crippling burden of proof, prosecutors' peremptory challenges 
are now largely immune from constitutional scrutiny."57 Instead, the Court 
charted a new path and urged that defendants establish an "'invidious 
quality"'58 in the exercise of peremptory challenges which could be "'traced 
to a racially discriminatory purpose."'59 
Again recognizing the difficulty of establishing such purposeful 
discrimination, the Supreme Court adopted a holistic approach whereby 
courts were instructed to "undertake 'a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available,"'60 allowing 
for the use of both "circumstantial evidence of invidious intent"61 and "proof 
of discriminatory impact."62 As such, the Court landed at a test whereby the 
assessment of the appropriateness of the exercise of peremptory challenges 
is contingent upon an evaluation of the "totality of the relevant facts"63 to 
assess whether they give "rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose."64 
While the Court acknowledged that a situation akin to Swain, in which the 
defendant established that "members of his race have not been summoned 
for jury service over an extended period of time,"65 would in fact "raise[] an 
inference of purposeful discrimination because the 'result bespeaks 
discrimination, "'66 the defendant need not meet this higher systemic test. 
Instead, the Court in Batson rejected Swain by lowering the evidentiary 
requirement to allow the defendant to establish a prima facie case in other 
ways more particular to, and indeed related only to, his or her case; the 
court thereby fashioned a more accessible test for defendants in that they 
could now look to the expansive totality of their circumstances to tease out 
improper prosecutorial motivations.67 Accordingly, a seemingly isolated or 
57. Id. at 92-93. 
58. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ). 
59. Id. (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at 240). 
60. Id. at 93 (quoting Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
266 (1977)). 
61. Id. 
62. Id.; see also id. (recognizing that "'total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of 
Negroes from jury venires ... is itself such an unequal application of the law ... as to show 
intentional discrimination" (quoting Washington, 426 U.S. at 241-42 (internal quotations 
omitted))). 
63. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,482 (1954) ). 
67. Id. at 95 ("[T]his Court had found a prima facie case on proof that members of the 
defendant's race were substantially underrepresented on the venire from which his jury was 
drawn, and that the venire was selected under a practice providing 'the opportunity for 
discrimination.'" (citation omitted)). 
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"'single invidiously discriminatory'"68 prosecutorial act would no longer be 
inoculated or "'immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the 
making of other comparable decisions."'69 In short, Batson held that there 
need not be an established legacy of prosecutorial discrimination for a 
defendant to make a viable Fourteenth Amendment challenge. Rather, the 
court should consider the full range of prosecutorial behavior during the 
course of the trial proceedings in assessing whether a prima facie case of the 
discriminatory exercise of a peremptory challenge had been made. 
Accordingly, instead of a prosecutorial presumption of fairness per 
Swain, the Court in Batson recognized the reality of an adversarial system in 
which "the Court has declined to attribute to chance the absence of black 
citizens on a particular jury array where the selection mechanism is subject 
to abuse."70 It is momentous that the Court would make so bold an 
observation-barring a complete lack of diversity in the jury pool, instances 
of homogeneity in the construction of juries are not mere happenstance and 
should, therefore, be regarded with suspicion. Furthermore, recognizing the 
reality of racially skewed exercises of discretion, the Batson Court indicated 
that the defendant was permitted to rely upon the indisputable fact "that 
peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 
'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. "'71 Therefore, the 
tremendous promise of Batson originates in the Court's critical awareness of 
the vagaries of race and the reality of having either consciously or 
unconsciously racially corrupt decision-making processes. This racial reality 
check led the Court ultimately to conclude that the determination of 
whether the prosecutor had exercised his or her use of peremptory 
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner required "consider[ation of] 
all relevant circumstances."72 
For purposes of an analysis of the Snyder case, it is important to note 
that the Supreme Court in Batson provided further guidance as to exactly 
what relevant circumstances might include. In this vein, the Court 
highlighted "a pattern of strikes against black jurors"73 and the "prosecutor's 
questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his 
challenges" as illustrative examples of circumstances in which a prosecutor's 
use of peremptory challenges might rise to the level of purposeful 
discrimination. 74 These examples are helpful in comprehending the robust 
interpretive posture expected of a trial judge in assessing a prima facie case 
of discrimination. After such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the 
68. Batson, 476 U.S. at 95. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,562 (1953)). 
72. Id. at 96-97. 
73. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. 
74. Id. 
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prosecutor to offer a race-neutral explanation for the discriminatory 
challenges of potential jurors. Only then will the trial court have the "duty to 
determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination"-the 
third prong of the Batson three-part test. 75 
While shifting this burden to the prosecutor, the Supreme Court did 
not shirk from its longstanding belief in the system of peremptory 
challenges; in Swain, the court affirmed that "[t]he persistence of 
peremptories and their extensive use demonstrate the long and widely held 
belief that [the] peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury."76 
Rather, the Court confirmed that the Batson challenge was meant to impose 
some restrictions upon the use of peremptories and that the prosecutor's 
explanation need not rise to the level required to justify the exercise of 
challenges for cause.77 Batson requires something more from the prosecutor 
than intuition or the mere assumption of race-based partiality,78 or the 
assertion of good faith or denial of racist motivations.79 The prosecutor is 
expected to "articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to 
be tried."80 In my estimation, this lack of rigor in the examination of the 
rationale for the prosecutor's racist use of peremptory challenges is the 
Achilles' heel of the Batson decision. The Supreme Court itself in Miller-El v. 
Dretkd31 stated that "Batson's individualized focus came with a weakness of its 
own owing to its very emphasis on the particular reasons a prosecutor might 
give."82 This weakness, combined with the new emphasis on judicial 
explanation added by the Snyde/33 majority to the third prong of the Batson84 
75. Id. at 98. 
76. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,219 (1965). 
77. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 98. 
80. Id. 
81. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). 
82. Id. at 239 (" [l)f any facially neutral reason sufficed to answer a Batson challenge, then 
Batson would not amount to much more than Swain."). 
83. Justice Alito, writing for the majority in Snyder, stated: 
As noted above, deference is especially appropriate where a trial judge has made a 
finding that an attorney credibly relied on demeanor in exercising a strike. Here, 
however, the record does not show that the trial judge actually made a 
determination concerning [the back-struck juror's) demeanor. The trial judge was 
given two explanations for the strike. Rather than making a specific finding on the 
record concerning· [the back-struck juror's) demeanor, the trial judge simply 
allowed the challenge without explanation. 
Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1209 (2008). 
84. See Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1213 (Thomas,]., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated: 
The Court second-guesses the trial court's determinations in this case merely 
because the judge did not clarify which of the prosecutor's neutral bases for 
striking Mr. Brooks was dispositive. But we have never suggested that a reviewing 
court should defer to a trial court's resolution of a Batson challenge only if the trial 
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test, provides easy means of subverting the protection against the type of 
discrimination against which Batson was meant to guard. Now, either a 
prosecutor can come up with some feasible race-neutral explanation for his 
or her discriminatory behavior or the trial judge will be accorded deference 
so long as he or she explains the bases upon which he or she has denied the 
Batson challenge. 
The Batson decision's tremendous potential is undermined by this punt 
to prosecutors and excessive deference to the trial judge-it allows for too 
easy a papering of the file and a posture of protective covering so as to avoid 
appeal grounds. As seen in Snyder v. Louisiana, the neutral-explanation test 
in Batson is too deferential to prosecutors and allows for the use of 
pretextual, dubious, and inconsistent prosecutorial responses. Thus, as will 
be shown, despite the further guidance provided by the Supreme Court in 
Miller-El, the Batson test has provided trial judges with too flimsy a standard 
against which to hold prosecutorial misconduct as manifest in the continued 
racist use of peremptory challenges. The new Supreme Court emphasis on 
judicial explanation similarly instructs a trial judge to speak his or her 
rationale for disallowing the Batson challenge into the record if judicial 
deference on appeal is desired-pretext can still operate so long as it is 
judicial pretext cloaked by race-neutral rationale. The point at which the 
Court should have arrived was an emphasis on the robust assessment of 
racial motivation allowed for by its previous decisions. 
Indeed, in seeking to further elucidate the promise of Batson, the 
Supreme Court in Miller-El bluntly explained the manner in which the 
neutrality assessment should be made. In recognizing the existence of 
prejudices that often impact the judgment of jurors,85 the Court 
acknowledged that racially skewed juror panels do not happen on their 
own-"Happenstance," the Court chided "is unlikely to produce this 
disparity."86 As such, in delving into the prosecutorial explanation for prima 
facie discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the Court gave several 
concrete prescriptions meant to cure "the rub," meaning the "practical 
difficulty of ferreting out discrimination. "87 
First, the Court in Miller-El deemed "side-by-side" comparisons of struck 
and retained jurors a more persuasive indicator of discrimination than 
statistical records.88 Specifically, in analyzing the prosecutor's rationale for 
striking jurors of color, an assessment should be made of whether that 
court made specific findings with respect to each of the prosecutor's proffered 
race-neutral reasons. 
85. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 237-38. 
86. Id. at 241. 
87. Id. at 238. 
88. Id. at 241. 
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rationale should also have led to the striking of white jurors. This 
"comparative juror analysis"89 requires the court to assess, by "contrasting 
voir dire questions posed respectively to black and non-black panal 
members,"90 whether the prosecutor's rationale is "' []worthy of 
credence."'91 As such, in assessing the neutrality of the prosecutor's 
explanation, the trial court must query whether the prosecutor has the same 
concerns and questions of white and non-white jurors alike. Otherwise the 
proffered explanations likely "reek[] of afterthought."92 Such 
inconsistencies reveal the prosecutor's proposed neutral explanation as 
pretext and, hence, an implausible basis upon which to uphold 
discriminatory peremptory strikes. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the 
sentiments expressed in the recent case of Ex parte Travi113 by quoting the 
Alabama Supreme Court: "The State's failure to engage in any meaningful 
voir dire examination on a subject the State alleges it is concerned about is 
evidence suggesting that the explanation is a sham and a pretext for 
discrimination."94 If there is really cause for concern one would expect a 
rich exchange before the court on the matter. 
While the prosecutor's motives are his or hers alone, the Court goes on 
to provide guidance as to how this element must be analyzed. Hence the 
assessment is necessarily objective-whether the prosecutor's explanation 
for seemingly discriminatory use of peremptory challenges is reasonable,95 
"how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and ... whether 
the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy."96 This 
stringent objective test does not merely assess whether the trial judge "can 
imagine a reason [for the race-based peremptory challenges] that might not 
have been shown up as false."97 Rather, the "prosecutor simply has got to 
state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausibility of the 
reasons he gives."98 Thus, the objective test component of the neutral-
explanation assessment calls for more than an "exercise in thinking up any 
rational basis"99 on which to justify the racially discriminatory peremptory 
challenges; instead, it requires the trial court to assess whether the response 
is pretext and hence implausible when considered in the context of the 
89. Id. 
90. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 255. 
91. Id. at 241 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 
(2000)). 
92. Id. at 246. 
93. Ex parteTravis, 776 So. 2d 874 (Ala. 2000). 
94. Miller-nt, 545 U.S. at 246 (quoting Travis, 776 So. 2d at 881). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,339 (2003)). 
97. Id. at 252. 
98. Id. 
99. Miller-£~ 545 U.S. at 252. 
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entire voir dire testimony. JOO While a systemic analysis is not necessary, this 
objective assessment of the prosecutor's explanation is further buttressed by 
any information indicating "broader patterns" or racialized use of 
peremptory challenges. 101 Again, the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Snyder makes a mockery of this broader assessment of prosecutorial 
behavior-the Court had the opportunity to explore in depth the numerous 
instances of unethical and racially inflammatory behaviors of the 
prosecutors, yet it remained mute, preferring instead to act as if the 
prosecutorial misconduct took place in a colorblind manner. The Supreme 
Court ultimately found discrimination, but failed to name it as racism. 
Instead, Miller-El requires courts to consider objectively whether the 
racially homogenous jury construction can be "explained away." 102 The trial 
court is instructed to consider the prosecutor's responses not in isolation, 
but in the context of cumulative evidence that leads to the conclusion of 
discrimination. 103 Thus, when the evidence fits a hypothesis of racial 
discrimination, as racism explains the resulting jury pool better than the 
race neutral reason offered, 104 the third step of the Batson test is fulfilled and 
the court should find that the prosecution exercised its peremptory 
challenges in a discriminatory fashion. This is precisely what was not done in 
the Louisiana decisions in Snyder. 105 By contrast, the Supreme Court found 
that the prosecution exercised the challenges in a discriminatory way, but 
failed to undertake an informed and contextual analysis of the many reasons 
why the Court was correct in so finding. 
Despite my agreement with the ultimate outcome of Snyder, the analysis 
of the case demonstrates a lack of rigor-the majority of the Court, while 
reaching what I believe to be the appropriate outcome, shied away from any 
serious engagement with the Fourteenth Amendment or its racial 
underpinning. As will be discussed below, the Court's decision in Snyder is 
whitewashed and does the seemingly impossible-it employs as race-neutral 
and as colorblind an analysis as possible under the bailiwick of a race-based 
Batson challenge. 
II. SNYDER AND THE PROSECUTORIAL USE OF RACIAL PROXIES--
THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT DECISION 
Allen Snyder and his wife Mary, both African-American, separated in 
the summer of 1995.106 Theirs was a rocky relationship as Allen had been 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 253. 
102. Id. at 263. 
103. Id. at 265. 
104. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 266. 
105. State v. Snyder (Snyder II), 942 So. 2d 484 (La. 2006), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008); 
State v. Snyder (Snyder I), 750 So. 2d 832 (La. I 999). 
106. Snyder I, 750 So. 2d at 836. 
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physically abusive and both had pursued other relationships toward the end 
of their marriage. 107 Despite Mary and the kids having left the Snyders' 
home to live with Mary's mother, Allen contacted Mary seeking 
reconciliation. 108 Mary agreed to meet with Allen the next day, but declined 
his request to meet that evening. 109 Instead, that night Mary went out with 
Howard Wilson and did not accept pages from her estranged husband 
during the date. 110 Upon returning in Wilson's car to her mother's home 
after midnight, Allen approached the driver's side, opened the vehicle door 
and proceeded to stab Wilson nine times and Mary nineteen times. 111 
Wilson died from his wounds; Mary survived. 112 
Prior to Snyder's trial, lead prosecutor James Williams made public 
statements referring to this case as "his OJ. Simpson case."113 It is important 
to note that temporally the Snyder trial took place less than a year after the 
acquittal of athlete and celebrity OJ. Simpson. 114 Further, the Snyder trial 
was heard in a community known for its racial divisions-Jefferson Parish, 
the site of former clansman David Duke's ascendancy.115 As both Batson and 
MiUer-El have taught us, context matters. 
Defense counsel moved to prevent Williams from making further 
comparisons of the Snyder and OJ Simpson cases, either to the media or 
the jury, as "surveys conducted since the verdict in the OJ. Simpson trial 
have shown consistently that a large majority of white Americans believe that 
the not guilty verdicts were wrong."116 However, the trial judge accepted 
Williams's promise, that '"as an officer of the court' he would make no 
references to the OJ. Simpson case before the jury."117 In addition, the 
court also denied the defense's second motion seeking to stop Williams's 





111. Snyder I, 750 So. 2d at 836. 
112. Id. 
113. David G. Savage, Citing Bias, justices Reject Death Sentence, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008, at 
All. 
114. OJ. Simpson was acquitted on October 3, 1995. L. Timothy Perrin, From OJ to 
McVeigh: The Use of Argument in the Opening Statement, 48 EMORYLJ. 107, 133 n.162 (1999). 
115. See Brief of Appellant-Petitioner at 3-4, Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203 (2008) 
(No. 06-10119) ("Less than six years earlier, white supremacist David Duke, a former grand 
wizard of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, carried Jefferson Parish in primaries for the United 
States Senate and governor of Louisiana, and completed a term representing a district in 
Jefferson Parish in the Louisiana House of Representatives." (footnotes omitted)). 
116. Id. at 6--7 (citations omitted). 
117. Id. at 2 (citations omitted); see a/,so id. at 6 (noting that the defense moved "to preclude 
the state from making any reference or comparison whatever-direct or indirect-to other 
notorious prosecutions, specifically Pe<1Jle of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson" 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
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based on Williams's representations to the court that he would "not at any 
time during the course of the taking of evidence or before the jury in this 
case, mention the OJ. Simpson case." 118 
Thereafter, in constructing the jury, the prosecution struck all five of 
the thirty-six black prospective jurors-one as a back-strike. 119 While the 
defense brought a Batson challenge at the time that the prosecution 
peremptorily struck the last three jurors, the trial judge rejected the 
challenge. Williams, after having achieved an all-white jury, reneged on his 
promise to the court and told the jurors that this case was '"very, very, very 
similar' to the OJ. Simpson case, where OJ. 'got away with it."'120 Even in 
his rebuttal argument, Williams again broke his promise to the court by 
mentioning "the most famous murder case in the last, in probably the 
recorded history, that all of you all are aware of ... happened in California 
very, very, very similar to this case." 121 
Though the Snyder case has had a serpentine procedural history with 
many twists and turns, 122 this Article focuses on the Louisiana Supreme 
Court's ruling and the subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In its decision, 
the Louisiana court selectively read Batson and Miller-El in such a way as to 
eviscerate the second and third prongs of the Batson test. Specifically, in 
seizing not upon the helpful instructions from the Supreme Court with 
respect to the manner of interpreting the prosecutor's neutral explanations 
for facially racially discriminatory peremptory challenges, the Louisiana 
court instead focused upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rice v. 
Collins123 for the proposition that "the race-neutral explanation need not be 
persuasive or even plausible."124 This appears to be a court inclined to revert 
back to the forbidden prosecutorial presumptions of fairness and equity 
from Swain. 
By stating, "It will be deemed race-neutral unless a discriminatory intent 
is inherent in the explanation," the Louisiana court blithely ignored the 
Supreme Court's instructions from Miller-EL Such logic is exactly what the 
Court in Miller-El moved away from in its adoption of an objective assessment 
of the prosecutor's stated explanation. Indeed, the Supreme Court plainly 
stated in Miller-El that more is expected from the prosecutor than an 
ll8. Id. at 8 (citation omitted). 
ll9. "Although African Americans made up approximately 20% of the population of 
Jefferson Parish in 1996, nine-10.6%-of the eighty-five prospective jurors questioned in the 
six panels were black. Four were dismissed for cause. The prosecutor used peremptory strikes to 
remove the remaining five." Id. at 10 (citations omitted). 
120. Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 115, at 2 (citation omitted). 
121. Id. at 39. The defense counsel had objected, but the trial judge overruled the 
objection. Id. 
122. For a description of this procedural posture, see Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 
1206-07 (2008). 
123. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006). 
124. State v. Snyder (Snyder II), 942 So. 2d 484,489 (La. 2006). 
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"exercise in thinking up any rational basis" on which to justify the racially 
discriminatory peremptory challenges. 125 The Louisiana court, in its 
insistence on presumptive prosecutorial race neutrality, ignored not only the 
fact that Batson overruled this logic, but also that Miller-El instructed courts 
to broaden their focus to include more than the prosecutor's proffered 
statements of explanation, but to analyze the plausibility of that explanation 
in the cumulative context of questionable prosecutorial behavior; the trial 
court must consider whether the prosecutor's explanation is pretext and 
thus implausible in light of the whole voir dire testimony. 126 
The Louisiana court's placement of the burden on the defendant 
evidences a fixation upon the Supreme Court jurisprudence of Rice, it 
asserted that "[t]he ultimate burden of persuasion as to racial motivation 
rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the peremptory 
challenge."127 But Rice was a slightly different legal case. First, it involved an 
objection to the striking of only one juror-a young African-American 
woman-not the striking of all black jurors as happened in Snyder. Second, 
Rice involved an application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). In such a case, a federal habeas court has a slightly 
higher standard-it must find that the state court reached a conclusion that 
was "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 
presented in the State court proceeding."128 Thus the Snyder Court seized 
upon a much more rigorous standard of review-this much is made clear by 
the Court in Rice itself when it stated: 
On direct appeal in federal court, the credibility findings a trial 
court makes in a Batson inquiry are reviewed for clear error. . . . 
Under AEDPA, however, a federal habeas court must find the state-
court conclusion "an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 
Thus, a federal habeas court can only grant Collins' petition if it 
was unreasonable to credit the prosecutor's race-neutral 
explanations for the Batson challenge. State-court factual findings, 
moreover, are presumed correct; the petitioner has the burden of 
rebutting the presumption by "clear and convincing evidence."129 
As such, the focus in Rice is not on the evidence at hand or on whether 
the prosecutor's explanation is plausible in light of the totality of his or her 
conduct at the voir dire, but upon the judge and whether he or she could 
reasonably have accepted the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation. In 
short, the focus under AEDPA is not upon error, but upon whether an 
125. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231,252 (2005). 
126. Id. 
127. Snyder, 942 So. 2d at 489 (citation omitted). 
128. Rice, 546 U.S. at 338. 
129. Id. at 338-39. 
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unreasonable judicial decision overcomes a presumption of judicial 
correctness. It is one thing to find the rationale of a judge unreasonable: it is 
quite another to view the prosecutor's explanations for error in the 
cumulative context of the entirety of the voir dire. For these reasons, the 
Louisiana court should have focused on the Supreme Court's instructions in 
Miller-El not Rice. 
Miller-El would have required the Louisiana court in Snyder to consider 
objectively whether the racially homogenous jury construction could be 
"explained away." 130 The court should have considered the prosecutor's 
reasons for striking three out of four of the potential black jurors and the 
later back-strike of the fifth of five black jurors not in isolation, 131 but in the 
context of cumulative evidence of racialized jury strikes that achieved an all-
white jury. This in tum would have led to a finding of discrimination. 132 In 
addition, the Louisiana court should not have allowed the allegation of 
purported nervousness on the part of the back-struck juror, as "strikes based 
on vague references to attributes like demeanor 'are largely irrelevant to 
one's ability to serve as a juror and expose venirepersons to peremptory 
strikes for no real reason except for their race. "'133 
The totality of the Snyder voir dire should have led the Louisiana 
Supreme Court to recognize that the evidence fit a hypothesis of racial 
discrimination. Racism, not happenstance, explained the resulting jury pool 
better than the race-neutral reasons proffered by the prosecutors. 134 A 
130. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 263. 
131. For instance, in explaining the back-strike of Jeffrey Brooks, Williams stated that 
[T]he main reason is that he looked very nervous to me throughout the 
questioning, Number 2. [Also]. he's one of the fellows that came up at the 
beginning and said he was going to miss class. He's a student teacher. My main 
concern is that for that reason, ... he might [want] to go home quickly [and] 
come back with guilty of a lesser verdict so there wouldn't be a penalty phase. 
Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 115, at 26. Defense counsel challenged these assertions 
by pointing to the fact that the clerk of the court had called Brooks's school and the dean had 
indicated that there would not be a problem. Further, regarding nervousness, defense counsel 
stated, "hell, everybody out here looks nervous. I'm nervous." Id. at 27. 
With respect to the strike of Elaine Scott, the two prosecutors gave different reasons. 
Williams claimed that he had "observed she was very weak on her ability to consider the 
imposition of the death penalty." Id. at 34. The prosecution indicated that, "she was very 
positive [when I mentioned] a life sentence, she was very positive on her reason-her 
agreement that she could do that." Id. The defense brief points out not only that Scott had 
replied similarly to the white potential jurors, but that she has also unequivocally stated, "I 
could," when asked about her ability to apply the death penalty. Id. at 35. This response was the 
same as that given by a number of other jurors. Id. at 36. As such the petitioner's brief noted 
that the prosecution had mischaracterized Scott's testimony and declined to seek clarification 
of her response, as it did with a similarly situated white juror. Id. at 37. 
132. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 26:H56. 
133. State v. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d 648,655 (Mo. 2006). 
134. Cf Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 266 (finding discrimination where no other plausible reasons 
explained the totality of the prosecutor's actions). 
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cumulative and contextual review of the voir dire reveals that the third step 
of Batson is fulfilled-the court should have found that the prosecution 
exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion. By 
constructing a racially homogenous jury, the prosecutor found a far more 
sympathetic audience for his racially polarizing OJ. Simpson analogy. 
Not only did the Louisiana court ignore the fact that the Supreme 
Court plainly held that "a defendant may establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination in the selection of the petit jury solely on 
evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at 
the defendant's trial,"135 but it also failed to hold the prosecutor's proffered 
race-neutral explanations to an objectively reasonable standard, preferring 
instead the long-abolished stance of prosecutorial deference and 
presumptions of fairness in the face of cumulative and contextual evidence 
that such assertions were mere pretext. Somehow the Louisiana court 
managed to consider the prosecutor's comments and peremptory challenges 
in an abstract manner that completely ignored the racial context, and even 
subtext, clearly at play. Unbelievably, the U.S. Supreme Court has managed 
to reach a different conclusion while doing the same thing. 
III. THE COLLISION OF OJ. AND SNYDER 
It would not take much insight to recognize the racial polarization 
surrounding the OJ. Simpson case. Orenthal James Simpson was accused, 
indicted, and later acquitted of murdering his ex-wife Nicole and her friend 
Ronald Goldman. 136 Given the history and legacy of racial division, hostility, 
and segregation in America, 137 what followed the verdict was, in my 
estimation, similarly expected-generally whites and blacks viewed the case 
in radically different ways. Indeed, numerous commentators noted that the 
OJ. Simpson trial was incredibly racially divisive. 138 
135. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). The Supreme Court in Batson went on to 
state that, in order to meet this test, the defendant has to establish that "he is a member of a 
cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to 
remove from the venire members of the defendant's race." Id. (citation omitted). 
136. SeeJEFFREYTOOBIN, THE RUN OF HIS LIFE: THE PEOPLE V. OJ. SIMPSON 3 (1996); see also 
LAWRENCE SCHILLER & JAMES WILLWERTH, AMERICAN TRAGEDY: THE UNCENSORED STORY OF THE 
SIMPSON DEFENSE 4-42 (1996). 
137. SeeJomills Henry Braddock II &James M. McPartland, Social-Psychological Processes that 
Perpetuate R.acial Segregation: The Relationship Between School and Emplayment Desegregation, 19 J. 
BLACK STUD. 267, 285-86 (1989); Dennis D. Parker, Are Reports of Brown '.s Demise Exaggerated? 
Perspectives of a School Desegregation Litigator, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1069, 1073-83 (2004-2005); 
Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 197, 213-24 (2004). 
138. See VINCENT BUGLIOSI, OUTRAGE: THE FIVE REAsONS WHYOJ. SIMPSON COT AWAY WITH 
MURDER 65-90 (1996); CHRISTOPHER A. DARDEN WITH JESS WALTER, IN CONTEMPT 368--72 
(1996); Darnell M. Hunt, (Re)Afjirming Race: "Reality," Negotiation, and the "Trial of the Century, "38 
Soc. Q. 399, 400-02 (1997); Leonard Green, Racism Is Still the Hot Coal the Nation Refuses to 
Touch, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 2, 1995, at 4, available at 1995 \,\'LNR 260446 (stating that the OJ. 
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Highlighting its centrality in American popular culture, the Peop!,e v. 
Simpson139 was frequently referred to as "The Trial of the Century" by 
newspapers and media personalities alike. It was, however, criminal trial cum 
media frenzy, which revealed the salience of race in America. If ever there 
was a doubt, race continues to matter in the United States, not the least 
because blacks and whites140 continue to exhibit what has been called "raced 
ways of seeing"141 in ordering and understanding their environments. 
Simpson case was "one of the most racially divisive trials of our history"); Sheryl Stolberg, The 
Simpson Legacy: just Under the Skin, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1995, at S3. 
139. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995), available at 1995 \NL 
21768. 
140. I do not accept the stability of the black-white binary, because America is, and has 
always been, a multicultural and mixed-race nation. See DAVID R. ROEDIGER, COLORED WHITE: 
TRANSCENDING THE RACIAL PAST 138-68 (2002) (discussing the prejudices suffered by American 
immigrants of many ethnicities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries); HOWARD WINANT, 
THE NEW POLITICS OF RACE: GLOBALISM, DIFFERENCE, JUSTICE 7-8 (2004) (providing examples 
of racist American actions, policies, and attitudes promulgated by the white majority against 
blacks, Asians, Hispanics, and Native Americans at the tum of twentieth century); Id. at 43-44 
("This [post-civil-rights] period has ... witnessed the substantial diversification of the North 
American population, in the aftennath of the 1965 reform of immigration laws. Panethnic 
phenomena have increased among Asians, Latinos, and Native Americans, reconstituting the 
U.S. racial panorama in a multipolar (as opposed to the old bipolar) direction."). See generally 
Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial 
17iought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997) (illustrating the black-white binary paradigm prevalent in 
racial discourse, denouncing that paradigm's exclusion of Latinos, and calling for a shift away 
from the binary paradigm and toward broader and more inclusive concepts of race and racism). 
However, given the prevalence of this divide in the literature with respect to the OJ. 
Simpson case and verdict, I, too, will privilege this exclusive binary paradigm, as it focuses our 
attention on the fact that the social divide between blacks and whites is greater than the divide 
between any other two racial groups. See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, 
SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL, at xii (1992) ("In many respects, other [racial] groups find 
themselves sitting as spectators, while the two prominent players [black and white] try to work 
out how or whether they can coexist with one another."); Id. at 14 ("The fact [is] that blacks are 
separated more severely than any other group .... "); Id. at 15-16 (explaining that the book 
focuses on the black and white races because "intermediate" groups like Asians, Hispanics, and 
Native Americans are not subject to the presumptions of inferiority associated with blacks and 
because more members of the intermediate groups are merging into the "white" category); 
Erica Chito Childs, Looking Behind the Stereotypes of the "Angry Black Woman": An Exploration of 
Black Women's Responses to Interracial Relationships, 19 GENDER & Soc'Y 544, 544 (2005) ('"Blacks 
and whites continue to be the two groups with the greatest social distance, the most spatial 
separation, and the strongest taboos against interracial marriage."' (quoting KERRY 
ROCKQUEMORE & DAVID BRUNSMA, BEYOND BLACK: BIRACIAL IDENTITY IN AMERICA, at ix 
(2001))); Hunt, supra note 138, at 400 ("[T]he labels white and black continue to define the 
top and bottom of the U.S. racial-socio-economic order, thereby serving as important status 
anchors in an increasingly multiracial society." (citation omitted)). See generally DERRICK BELL, 
RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAi'1 LAW (5th ed. 2004) (discussing race in American law and focusing 
on the black-white binary); DOUGLASS. MAssEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (discussing the establishment, 
maintenance, and future of black-white housing segregation and noting that other racial 
groups have not experienced the same degree of geographic segregation). 
141. Hunt, supra note 138, at 403--04. 
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Despite the dynamism that we now know pervades the fluidity, elasticity, 
and constructedness of race-that race is a socio-political construct142-we 
are stuck with the essential reality that much of the way in which we 
"negotiate, contest, and affirm" 143 our existence is a process that is deeply 
raced. The method of producing race, therefore, is an interactive one, which 
"works through social interaction to erect structures of thought, to 
naturalize racial differences, and to reproduce group boundaries."144 
This reification of race is crucial in understanding Williams's move to 
construct an all-white jury-given the racial lenses through which society 
views the world, he must have known that he was constructing a jury more 
sympathetic to his OJ. analogies and, therefore, a jury more likely to seek 
the death penalty for Snyder. 145 Viewed in this light, the prosecution's 
statements, mischaracterizations, and use of peremptory challenges were the 
ironic playing of the "race card"146 routinely claimed against the OJ. 
142. The term "sociopolitical construct" is meant to convey the fact that there is no 
biological reality of race, only a socially constmcted reality that gives race meaning. See Miriam 
R. Hill & Volker Thomas, Strategi,es for Racial Identity Devdopment: Narratives of Black and White 
Women in Interracial Partner Relationships, 49 FAM. REL. 193, 193 (2000) ("[R]ace is not a typology 
of concrete, mutually exclusive categories. We can best understand it within a social 
constmctionist framework as the negotiated interaction between a societal phenomenon of 
categorization based on physical markers . . . and a personal phenomenon of identity 
development."). 
143. Hunt, supra note 138, at 399. 
144. Id. 
145. See Tara L. Mitchell et al., Racial Bias in Mock Juror Decision-Making: A Meta-Analytic 
Review of Defendant Treatment, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 633 (2005) ("Based upon the current 
meta-analysis, it appears that the effect of racial bias in juror decision-making is small, yet 
reliable."); Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based judgments, Race-Neutral 
justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson Challenge, 31 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 261, 269-72 (2007) (finding that race influences the use of peremptory challenges, but 
that such use is often justified in race-neutral terms); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. 
Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALl1Y 
& Soc. PSYCH0L. BULL. 1367, 1376, 1378 (2000) (noting that the study "demonstrate[d] that 
explicit references to racial issues in an interracial trial have different effects on White and 
Black jurors" and "suggest[ed] that \,Vhitejurors (and by extension White police officers, White 
Judges, White lawyers, etc.) still demonstrate bias in cases where racial issues are not 
emphasized, justifying Black jurors' skepticism about the fairness of the criminal justice 
system"). 
146. See George Skelton, 'Race Cards' Succeed All Too Often, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1995, at A3. 
Skelton reported: 
We can only speculate about the race card's tme effect on the Simpson jury, 
which included nine blacks. IL was "barely a blip," one African American juror told 
The [L.A.] Times. The jury simply did not accept the· prosecution's evidence, he 
said. "It was garbage in, garbage out." 
We cannot get into the minds of jurors. But we do not need to get into the mind 
of defense attorney Johnnie L. Cochran Jr. We heard and read his words to the 
jury. And its verdict proved that his blatant playing of the race card, at the least, 
did not hurt Simpson's case. 
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Simpson "dream team." 147 Thus despite the process through which race is 
engineered and maintained in American society, there remains a racial fixity 
"Not only did we play the race card, we dealt it from the bottom of the deck," 
attorney Robert L. Shapiro, Cochran's colleague, told ABC-lV's Barbara Walters. 
"(Cochran) believes everything in America relates to race. I don't." 
Id.; see al.so Lorraine Adams, Simpson Jurors Cite Weak Case, Not 'Race Card'.· Police Handling of 
Evidence Was Major Concern for Panel, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1995, at Al. Adams reported: 
Members of the OJ. Simpson jury said today it was a lack of evidence and not 
the "race card" that led them to acquit the former football star in a verdict that has 
sharply divided Americans along racial lines. 
But today juror Brenda Moran, a 45-year-old computer technician, singled out 
the Los Angeles Police Department's handling of the case as the major factor in 
the verdict. "We didn't even deal with that deck, period, from the bottom. We 
didn't even get to that issue," said Moran, who is African American. 
Id. Another reporter described the situation: 
The Simpson-Goldman murder trial has been skillfully hijacked. The sideshow 
has become the main event. Asking the jury to rise up against a racist system is a 
brilliant defense strategy and a terrible abuse of the criminal-justice system. This is 
not what juries are supposed to do. 
Fuhrman's outspoken racism made Cochran's job easier. It is far easier for 
Cochran to argue that Fuhrman is guilty than that Simpson is innocent. Simpson 
became the stand-in victim for every African-American who has ever been 
brutalized by the police-and there have been many-while the murder victims 
were relegated to the sideshow. 
By late last week, Cochran was comparing the Simpson case to Brown v. Board 
of Education and the fight against slavery, to standing ovations at the 
Congressional Black Caucus conference on Washington .... 
. . . . [Simpson's defense attorneys] kept the focus squarely where Cochran 
wanted it-on race. 
Susan Estrich, Op-Ed., The Simpson Case; Not the Facts: Having a jury Rull! on Social Probwms, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. I, 1995, at Ml. 
147. Nora Zamichow, Fred Goldman Deluged uy Offers of Help, LA. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at 
A29. Zamichow reported: 
Goldman's legal battle against Simpson has quickly assumed a David vs. Goliath 
aura. Simpson spent almost $6 million on his defense in the murder trial, pitting 
Johnnie L. Cochran Jr. and the rest of the "Dream Team" against the county 
district attorney's office. And Simpson's recent comments indicate he has ample 
funds to wage his battles in civil court. 
Lorraine Adams & Serge F. Kovaleski, The Best Defense Money Could Buy; Well-Heell!d Simpson Legal 
Team Seemed One Step Ahead All Along, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1995, at Al; see al.so Nell Henderson & 
Marc Fisher, OJ Simpson Acquitted; Football Legend 'Relieved' at Verdicts After 9-Month Doubll! Murder 
Trial, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1995, at Al. This report described the defense team's strategy: 
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that strategic actors can easily mobilize for their benefits. This racial divide 
with respect to the OJ. Simpson case certainly existed at the time of the 
Snyder case, which was within a year of the OJ. Simpson verdict, as it 
continues to exist to this day. In fact, 
Opinion polls taken shortly after the murders and throughout the 
trial echoed this divide. Reports typically ignored the perceptions 
of Latinos, Asians, or Native Americans regarding Simpson's 
innocence or guilt and focused, instead, on differences between 
white and black Americans []. For example, a poll taken a few 
weeks after the murders found that 60 percent of black 
respondents considered Simpson, "not guilty," compared with only 
15 percent of white respondents. A poll taken shortly after the 
verdicts were announced found the gap still present: this time 78 
percent of black respondents considered Simpson innocent, while 
75 percent of white respondents considered him guilty. 148 
Indeed, during and following the OJ. Simpson case, much of the media 
frenzy surrounding the case actually foregrounded this divergent "raced way 
of seeing."149 This media coverage made race, and divergent racial 
Id. 
Simpson pleaded not guilty at his first arraignment more than a year ago and 
hired a multimillion-dollar "Dream Team" of more than a dozen expert trial 
attorneys, including some of the biggest names in the profession, to argue from the 
start that he was wrongly accused by police and prosecutors. 
148. Hunt, supra note 138, at 400. 
149. Id. at 403--04. For different perspectives on the Simpson trial, see Paul Duggan's article 
in The Washington Post 
"The issue is, for once in a lifetime, a black man was able to afford adequate 
representation," said Tene McCoy, 23, a Howard University law student. "We can 
now do what white people have been doing all the time." Mike Berning, a 60-year-
old consultant in the District, declared: "What all of this does show is you can hire 
justice in this country. Justice can be manipulated. It's all about money .... " 
... There were those who felt disgusted [by the verdict]. believing that a wealthy 
black man, able to hire the best lawyers money can buy, had exploited racial 
sensitivities among jurors and had escaped justice in a grisly double murder that is 
likely to go forever unpunished. There was, for instance, Jamie Evanicky, 24, who 
watched the acquittal on television in the Bennigan's restaurant in Springfield 
Mall. "I'm shocked," she said, declaring that "justice wasn't done. It turned into 
more of a racial thing than what actually happened. Race played too big a part in 
it. It's sad to see that, but that's the way it is in this country. "This proves how 
screwed-up out justice system is, because [the jurors] were looking at other issues 
than the matter at hand ... ." 
... "As far as I'm concerned, black America was on trial," said William Wilkins, a 
51-year-Old roofer, voicing what polls indicate is a widely held view among African 
Americans. "Cops have been doing this to us for years," said Wilkins, walking along 
Connecticut Avenue NW after Simpson's acquittal. "If cops see me walking up here 
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at ... night, they stop me and ask me what I'm doing up here. Like I can't walk 
Connecticut Avenue. That ain't freedom." 
1713 
Paul Duggan, Washington Comes to a Stop; Then Pent-Up Emotions Start Spilling Out, WASH. Posr, 
Oct. 4, 1995, at Al. For emotions following the verdict, see Howard Kurtz's article in The 
Washington Post 
Emotions were particularly raw [after the verdict] on talk radio, which 
reverberated with joyous black callers and angry white callers. On Washington's 
WOL, where a promotional spot said, "This is Johnnie Cochran and you're 
listening to WOL," owner Cathy Hughes gleefully sang, "Victory is ours!" 
... On Manhattan's WLIB, a black-oriented station, a woman named Robbie 
said of whites: "They are out to get us." 
Ken Hamblin, a black conservative, spoke with a caller to his syndicated show 
who said: "There are people, mostly black people, around this country who are 
saying, 'We beat the white scum at their game .... " 
... New York's Bob Grant called the verdict a "great travesty of justice." Boston 
[radio] host Howie Carr read faxed messages from white listeners: "Another killer 
walks the streets tonight." "I'm sick to my stomach." 
"Why don't we just open up the prisons and let 'em all go?" one caller said. 
"If this was a white guy, he would've been fried," another declared. 
"How can we possibly vote for Colin Powell now? How can we give them that 
much power?" 
Howard Kurtz, Hung Jury in the Court of Public opinion, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1995, at Bl. For 
other reactions of the verdict, see David Montgomery's article in The Washington Post 
"There are a lot of people in jail who are innocent," said Lorraine Washington, 
42, who is black and hailed Simpson's acquittal as justice being done. 
She didn't expect it to go that way. She said she was glad defense attorney 
Johnnie L. Cochran Jr. played the "race card," notably during his closing argument 
when he cited great civil rights figures of history. 
"If he was defending me and didn't bring that out, I would be very upset," 
Washington said. 
At the other end of the table sat Kate Kent, 34, who is white. She deplored the 
verdict and Cochran's closing speech, because to her it seemed to invite the jury to 
use their verdict to make a statement. 
"The jury said, 'We want a just society and we can't have it, because we've got a 
racist Los Angeles Police Department so we've got to acquit OJ.,'" Kent said. "I 
think the prosecution proved he was guilty .... " 
. . . Everybody said the trial had opened a valuable dialogue about race 
throughout the country. 
"It's uncomfortable, especially for white people, to talk about race because then 
they might have to admit the system is unfair," Kent said. 
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... In the Washington suburb of Arlington, Va., a refrigerator repairman named 
Albert Lee says he thinks Simpson was guilty. But to this African American, the 
verdict was sweet revenge, a kind of 'catching up' for three centuries worth of 
injustices visited upon his people. "Well," he declares, "it's our tum now." Rick 
Rogers, a white insurance salesman who lives in a small city north of Knoxville, 
Tenn., recoils at that line of thinking. The trial has made him tired of black 
complaints about racism. "It's getting a little ridiculous," he fumes. "Any time a 
white person does anything, it's racist." In Atlanta, Bev Murphy, a corporate 
banker, is furious over the way the media have stereotyped whites and blacks. She 
is white and yes, she thinks Simpson did it, as the majority of whites do. But she 
also thinks the case was tainted-a sentiment many other whites share. "I believe in 
the true justice system," she says angrily. "I don't believe in finding people guilty 
based on false evidence .... " 
David Montgomery, et al., Simpson Verdict Prompts Debates on justice, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1995, at 
Ml. For more opinions on the verdict, see Anna M. Virtue and Doug Conner's article in The Los 
Ange/,es Times. 
"Then the Fuhrman cover-up started, and everything fell into place for me," 
said Coats, who is African American and a payroll clerk at a Miami employment 
agency. "For me, it's more than OJ. 's trial. It's a moral issue. If he had been found 
guilty, any hope I had that racism could be beaten would have disappeared. []Now 
I think there's hope for the system .... " 
Halloran said Simpson was acquitted at least partly because of Mark Fuhrman, 
the Los Angeles police detective, now retired, whose repeated use of racist 
pejoratives became an angry point of contention. "Justice wasn't served. Race 
shouldn't have become an issue. After this verdict, spousal abuse will go up. The 
batterer will say he can get away with it. I'm not sure how to fix the system, but 
something has to be done .... " 
... Most positive reactions to the Simpson verdict, however, came from blacks, 
and most negative reactions came from whites. Tyrone Prince Ford, who shines 
shoes at a Washington, D.C., barber shop, said that anything but an acquittal 
verdict would have been "100% racism." 
Anna M. Virtue & Doug Conner, The Simpson Verdicts; From Coast to Coast, a Nation Is Divided on 
Simpson Verdict, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at Al I. For another response, see Michael Wilbon's 
article in The Washington Post. 
At a church in black Los Angeles, the pronouncement "not guilty" elicited a joyous 
celebration. In a classroom on the campus of Howard University, students erupted 
into prolonged cheers. On North Capitol Street, just north of Union Station, 
young black men who'd never met leaned out of cars and passionately high-fived 
each other because the Juice was loose. All over urban America you could find 
these scenes yesterday. It was as if acquitting OJ. Simpson made up for Rodney 
King and Emmitt Till. For all the black father and uncles and grandfathers who'd 
been jailed unjustly, for every brother who has been framed or railroaded, beaten 
into a confession or placed at the scene of a crime when he was a million miles 
away. 
Michael Wilbon, A Celebrity Goes Free, WASH. Posr, Oct. 4, 1995, at Fl. 
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viewpoints surrounding the OJ. Simpson case, common knowledge, capable 
of judicial notice. 150 Hence, it is preposterous to privilege the incredible 
prosecutorial race-neutral explanations in the Snyder context-not only 
because the prosecutor twice lied to the trial judge when he promised to 
refrain from invoking OJ. Simpson,151 which was ostensibly a matter of 
professional misconduct-but because anyone cognizant and paying even 
the slightest attention would have known that the mere mention of the OJ. 
150. Indeed, some of the media commentary even questioned the motivations and 
responses that this heightened coverage of race generated during and after the OJ. Simpson 
case: 
[Chicago Tribune reporter Jessica] Seigel, who like [ABC News Reporter 
Cynthia] McFadden is white, thinks the polls misstated or at least mischaracterized 
the attitudes of many African Americans toward Simpson's guilt or innocence. 
Most of these polls, she suggests, asked only a few questions and got predictably 
superficial or knee:ierk answers about feelings that were really quite complex. The 
reporting on these polls has been "creating (racial) divisions where there might 
not be any," she said ..... 
Sam Fulwood III, an African American reporter in the Washington bureau of 
the Los Angeles Times, got similar results in his own, informal barbershop poll. "I 
don't think any blacks want to give up any black man ... to the white racist criminal 
justice system," Fulwood said. "If pollsters, 99% of whom are white, ask blacks if 
he's guilty, then the 'race gene' kicks in and they all say no. Privately, like in my 
barbershop, they may say, 'Oh yeah, he did it. But I wouldn't tell any white person 
that."' 
Within days of Simpson's arrest, African Americans were outraged by a Time 
magazine cover featuring Simpson's face. An artist at Time had modified the arrest 
photograph that had been released by the LAPD, and the resulting "photo 
illustration," as Time called it, made Simpson appear darker and more out of 
focus, more somber than the actual photo. 
Blacks and many whites said the cover made Simpson look guilty and they 
criticized Time for playing into unfair, inaccurate and damaging stereotypes that 
depict black men as sinister and menacing. James Gaines, the managing editor of 
Time, apologized for the cover, "a huge embarrassment," he called it and he 
denied any racist intent. "It was clearly a case of racial insensitivity," he said. "If 
there had been an African American at that place at that time, I'm sure we 
wouldn't have run that cover." 
David Shaw, Obsession: Did the Media Overfeed a Starving Public, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995, at S7. 
151. See Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 115, at 40. As stated in the brief: 
Id. 
Williams's invocation of the OJ. Simpson case in breach of his promise "as an 
officer of the court" is indicative of both his intent in striking African American 
jurors and the credibility of the reasons he proffered for striking them. The closing 
argument revealed beyond any question that neither Williams nor the reasons he 
gave for striking jurors were worthy of belief. The Louisiana Supreme Court erred 
in disregarding this evidence ofWilliams's discriminatory intent .... 
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Simpson verdict would be racially polarizing at best and, indeed, racially 
inflammatory at worst, when spoken to an all-white audience. In short, the 
intentional and repeated summoning of the OJ. Simpson case should be 
interpreted as an intentional reference to a racial proxy,152 as the public was 
repeatedly told that most blacks in America were relieved or happy about 
the verdict, while most whites felt the exact opposite. 153 In addition to the 
sustained media attention, there was much academic commentary on the 
OJ. Simpson case and verdict as well-the racial overtones were made 
patently obvious. The country was bombarded from numerous 
interdisciplinary sources with the divergent racialized opinions brought on 
by the OJ. Simpson case-there was no escaping these pontifications. 
For instance, sociologist Herman Gray said, "'This case has put race on 
the agenda in a powerful way, a way that it hasn't been .... It may actually be 
another touchstone, like the L.A. riots, that we can point to to understand 
the nature of our conflicts, the racial organization of our society and our 
culture."'154 As journalist Sheryl Stolberg pointed out: 
[T]he celebration over Simpson's acquittal was not really a 
celebration over letting the Juice loose; the Juice is no Nelson 
Mandela. Rather, it was a moment of sweet triumph for all the 
anonymous black men in America who didn't have the money to 
buy a dream team of attorneys to fight a system that produces a 
racist cop like Mark Fuhrman-and does nothing to weed him 
out.155 
As such, although there were and are many black people who think that 
OJ. Simpson may not be innocent, the case is viewed against the backdrop 
of a criminal:iustice system that wreaks havoc in the lives of African-
Americans and black men in particular. It is within this context that one 
should place the remarks of English Professor Mary Helen Washington: 
I can understand the visceral response. You all do it to us every 
time, but you didn't do it to us this time. This was one strike against 
the racist, unjust criminal justice system. That's what I think it was. 
This was one time we fought it, and we succeeded in fighting it. 156 
Professor Joe Feagin went further by stating, 
152. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being "Regarded 
as" Black, and Why Tit/,e VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 
1283, 1297-1308 (exploring the problem of proxy discrimination as demonstrated through 
racial ascriptions made on the basis of names). 
153. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text (discussing the different perceptions 
between races of the OJ. Simpson case). 
154. Stolberg, supra note 138. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
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Black people have been saying [ that the system abuses African-
Americans] and documenting it with their bloody backs and heads 
for decades ... Most African Americans look at the OJ. Simpson 
case through totally different glasses for a very simple reason, and 
that is that black people generally don't get justice in the American 
criminal justice system.157 
1717 
Scholars have noted, however, that the OJ. Simpson case was anything but 
typical. It was anomalous in a number of important ways. Professor David 
Cole notes as much by stating: 
[I]t took an atypical case, one in which minority race and lower 
socioeconomic class did not coincide, in which the defense 
outperformed the prosecution, and in which the jury was 
predominantly black, for white people to pay attention to the role 
that class and race play in criminal justice. Yet the issues of race 
and class are present in every criminal case, and in the vast majority 
of cases they play out no more fairly. Of course, they generally work 
in the opposite direction: the prosecution outspends and 
outperforms the defense, the jury is predominantly white, and the 
defendant is poor and a member of a racial minority. In an odd 
way, then, the Simpson case brought to the foreground issues that 
lurk beneath the entire system of criminal justice. The system's 
legitimacy turns on equality before the law, but the system's reality 
could not be further from that ideai.158 
Interestingly, in addressing the reality of a racially biased criminal-
justice system, the Supreme Court in Batson recognized that "the reality of 
practice . . . shows that the [peremptory] challenge may be, and 
unfortunately at times has been, used to discriminate against black 
jurors."159 So if anyone was cognizant of this divergence, it would have been 
a prosecutor in Jefferson Parish in the same year in which the OJ. Simpson 
case was decided. "That the social realities of 'white' and 'black' Americans 
157. Id. Addressing the inevitable white backlash following the OJ. Simpson verdict, 
political scientist Andrew Hacker 
expect[ed] the [Simpson] acquittals to have ramifications far beyond the criminal 
justice system, as white anger translate[d] into a lack of support for affirmative 
action, welfare and other social programs that are important to blacks. "A lot of 
white people were very upset to see black people on TV looking that happy," 
Hacker says. "There are a lot of areas where black people, being in the minority, 
depend on white support and goodwill. And insofar as white people feel blacks are 





COLE, supra note 11, at 3 ( emphasis added). 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986). 
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might diverge around contested issues should come as no big surprise."160 
This is exactly why Williams's remarks, that this was "his OJ. Simpson 
case,"161 serve as a double whammy-they were the cross and the hook on 
the way to his death-sentence knock out of Snyder. Williams must have 
known the power of his words and the work that race does: 
Indeed, individual actors in the United States helplessly rely upon 
this bipolar framework [ whereby black and white continue to serve 
as status anchors], despite its shortcomings, to make sense of their 
own experiences and of their relationship to various social groups 
(i.e., their identity). Actors also depend upon this framework for 
sizing up others, for interpreting their actions, and formulating 
responses to them. In this sense, actors and the others they 
endeavor to understand are "raced," and raced ways of seeing 
becomes "ritual."162 
Therefore, by tapping into loaded racial tropes through his invocation 
of the most racially toxic case of our lifetimes, Williams must have known 
that his references to OJ. Simpson would speak volumes to the all-white jury 
he had intentionally constructed. Even if he did not actually know this, he 
ought to have been so aware; after all, the assessment of his race-neutral 
rationale is to be objective, based upon a reasonable-actor standard. 163 
Moreover, even denying actual subjective racial animus on the part of 
Williams, the effect may be the same: 
Even presuming that lawyers are always entirely honest and open 
about their motivations for striking jurors, there are powerful 
reasons to believe that much discrimination occurs at the 
subconscious level. Like all people, lawyers undoubtedly form 
negative impressions about others based on a wide array of factors, 
only some of which may be articulable. Often, the factors that 
trigger these negative assessments may be illicit criteria such as 
race, ethnicity, or gender. A well-intentioned lawyer thus may not 
only be unaware that her discomfort with a particular jury is race-
based, but might sincerely deny the allegation. 164 
160. Hunt, supra note 138, at 403. 
161. Savage,supranotell3. 
162. Hunt, supra note 138, at 404 (internal citations omitted). 
163. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text (discussing the required-Objective 
analysis). 
164. Covey, supra note 2, at 326; id. (noting that Justice Marshall observed that "seat--0f-the-
pants" and instinctual decisions about jurors may indeed be race-related and may be nothing 
more than "racial prejudice" at work); see also Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987), 321-23 (analyzing the 
difficulties inherent in intent-based discrimination tests given that much discrimination is 
subconscious). 
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Moreover, Williams's explanations for striking all the black jurors might 
be evidence of what has been coined "confirmation bias."165 "Confirmation 
bias is the tendency to bolster a hypothesis by seeking consistent evidence 
while disregarding inconsistent evidence."166 In this way the prosecution 
might unwittingly adhere to supportive hypotheses and rationales to buttress 
a previous decision. As Professor Elllsworth has stated, "They interpret facts, 
formulate questions, and search for information in a way that supports their 
beliefs without being aware that they are doing so."167 It is easy to see how a 
prosecutor seeking to fulfill step two of Batson might easily be susceptible to 
such bias; 
Confirmation bias can arise when people have a stake in a 
particular hypothesis or a strong desire to cling to a cherished 
belief. They may unwittingly seek new information or interpret 
existing information in a way that maintains their belief. Moreover, 
people are more likely to believe something is true if they also 
think it is desirable. But even without a reason to favor a particular 
hypothesis, people prefer hypothesis-consistent information. 168 
Of course Williams was successful before the Louisiana courts. Unlike 
another black man, OJ. Simpson, Allen Snyder would not "get away with it," 
especially not before Williams's all-white jury, as opposed to the mixed-race 
jury169 found in the OJ. Simpson trial. Williams knew all too well the 
disparate power of our "raced ways of seeing," evaluating, and punishing. 
Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court did not seize upon the occasion 
presented by Snyder to comment upon the heavily racialized environment 
and context in which the Snyder case and many other criminal cases take 
place. Incredibly, this loaded racial background is entirely ignored and, 
implausibly, OJ. Simpson and his case are copiously absent from both the 
majority and dissenting opinions. 
IV. CONCLUSION-THE SUPREME COURT'S MISSED OPPORTUNI1Y 
"Race has everything to do with group status. "1 70 
The racially inappropriate motives of the prosecutors in the Snyder case 
are revealed by reference to one simple question: what legitimate purpose 
165. See generally Barbara O'Brien & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Confirmation Bias in Criminal 
Investigations (1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Sept. 19, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=9l3357 (discussing confirmation bias and 
factors that influence it). 
166. Id. at 5. 
167. Id. at 6. 
168. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
169. See Hunt, supra note 138, at 400 ("[A] jury composed of nine blacks, two whites, and 
one Latino found Simpson not guilty of murdering his ex-wife and Goldman."). 
170. Id. at 403. 
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did the repeated invocation of the OJ. Simpson case serve? First, as early as 
Swain, the Supreme Court indicated that, "The function of the 
[peremptory] challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on 
both sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the 
case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not 
otherwise."171 As such, by injecting a racial externality-the OJ. Simpson 
case-into the jurors' minds, the prosecutor himself undermined the very 
foundations for the peremptory challenge. 
Second, not only were the OJ. Simpson references prejudicial, 
irrelevant, 172 and off-point, but given the pervasiveness of divergent "racial 
ways of seeing" the OJ. Simpson case, the references should be viewed as 
racially inflammatory remarks. 173 By invoking an irrelevant sensational case, 
widely known to be racially polarizing, the prosecutor damaged not only 
Snyder's prospects for a fair trial, but also the perception that justice had 
been done. 
The use of the peremptory challenge is intricately connected to the 
perception of fairness. Speaking about this appearance, the Supreme Court 
recognized that, "to perform its high function in the best way JUstice must 
satisfy the appearance ofjustice."'174 The Court in Batson put it thus: "Racial 
discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused whose life 
or liberty they are summoned to try .... The harm from discriminatory jury 
selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded 
juror to touch the entire community."175 As such, "[s]election procedures 
that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public 
confidence in the fairness of our system ofjustice."176 
Additionally, the Supreme Court decision in Powers v. Ohio177 highlights 
yet another important factor necessitating impartial jury construction. 
Service on a jury is an important democratic exercise demonstrative of 
citizenship rights. 178 This service is particularly important for "those who 
171. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,219 (1965). 
172. See Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, supra note 115, at 40. 
173. See Todd D. Peterson, Studying the Impact of R.ace and Ethnicity in the Federal Courts, 64 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. I 73, 173 (1996) ("Many African Americans believe that Simpson was 
prosecuted because he is black, while many white Americans believe that the jury acquitted 
Simpson because it was predominantly black. Both groups suspect that race negatively affects 
the judicial process, but they cannot agree on how it does so."); Stolberg, supra note 138 
("Something just as insidious and destructive [as lunch counter boycotts, calling out the 
National Guard and city blocks in flames] is occurring-a verbal riot of sorts, as people of all 
colors but particularly blacks and whites, vent their elation and their frustration over the 
outcome of the 'Trial of the Century.'"). Peterson's and Stolberg's articles are both cited in the 
petitioner's brief for Snyder. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 115, at 42. 
174. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). 
175. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986). 
176. Id. 
177. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
178. Id. at 402, 407. 
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otherwise might not have the opportunity to contribute to our civic life."179 
With some dissatisfaction, the Court noted that despite the fact that it had 
never "questioned the premise that racial discrimination in the qualification 
or selection of jurors offends the dignity of persons and the integrity of the 
courts,"180 there remained allegations of racial bias in the jury system. 181 
Therefore, in reaching the conclusion that race-based exclusions of jurors 
offend the Fourteenth Amendment irrespective of the race of the accused, 
the Court made an important statement which focused upon the rights of 
"ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of justice."182 Indeed, 
the Court recognized the socio-political importance of jury duty by noting 
that "with the exception of voting, 'for most citizens the honor and privilege 
of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the 
democratic process. '"183 This in turn ensures that ordinary citizens buy-in to 
the criminal:iustice system by fostering the "continued acceptance of the 
laws."184 
V. CARPE DIEM 
Had the Supreme Court seized the day, its decision in Snyderwould have 
looked very different. Dissenting Justices Thomas and Scalia were able to 
accuse the majority of "second-guess[ing] the trial court's determinations" 185 
because of the majority's failure to engage the fullness of the factual 
background, i.e., the racial noise of this case. In its refusal to address the 
record appropriately, which revealed not just the prosecutor's flimsy 
explanations for his jury strikes, but also his invocation of the OJ. Simpson 
case shortly after the OJ. Simpson verdict, the majority erases race from this 
case yet still manages to find discrimination. The manner in which it does 
this is, ironically, pretextual. I agree with the dissent that, absent the racial 
context in which the Snyder case was decided, it could indeed seem as if the 
majority was usurping the role of the trial judge. Such a racial vacuum, 
however, could easily have been filled by the majority based solely on the 
record before it. 
First, the narrative of the facts that Justice Alito laid down is 
mysteriously silent on the prosecutor's numerous references to the OJ. 
Simpson case and his broken promises to refrain from mentioning the case 
to the media and the jury.186 These facts, as outlined above, form part of the 
robust circumstantial considerations that courts are supposed to assess per 
179. Id. at 402. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Powers, 499 U.S. at 406. 
183. Id. at 407. 
184. Id. 
185. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1213 (2008) (Thomas,]., dissenting). 
186. See id. at 1206-08 (Alito's iteration of the facts). 
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both Batson and Miller-El. 187 They form part of the reason why, under the 
second prong of Batson, a reasonable person would be highly suspicious of 
Williams's attempts to explain his construction of an all-white jury. 
Second, even in the finding of the prima facie case of discrimination 
under the first prong of Batson, the Court neglected to name and 
deconstruct the nature of the prejudice as displayed. Oddly, while 
reiterating that "all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial 
animosity must be consulted"188 per Miller-El, the Court went on to do a 
cursory analysis of the strike of just one black juror, Brooks. In doing so, it 
failed to undertake the expansive contextual analysis to which it purportedly 
subscribes. This was a tremendous missed opportunity. It is remarkable that 
the Court in assessing the Batson challenges in Snyder did not even mention 
the OJ. Simpson case. 
The references to OJ. form part of the chain of causation that linked 
the prosecutor's animus to his strikes and back-strikes of black jurors. The 
prosecutor's OJ. Simpson refrain formed an important part of the racial 
context of Snyder, as it provided a lens through which to assess Williams's 
motivations for constructing the jury as he did. His final argument, with the 
inflammatory references to the OJ. Simpson case, would not have been 
persuasive to a jury with black members. Our "raced ways of seeing," the 
abundant media coverage detailing divergent opinions on the verdict along 
racial lines, and numerous polls indicate that either the prosecutor knew 
exactly what he was doing in constructing a more receptive jury for his 
arguments or he should have known. This racialized context is essential to 
this Snyder case. By ignoring it, the majority rendered an abstract opinion 
devoid of important and informative contextual information. 
Third, even in its brevity, the majority opinion evaded Batson. Justice 
Ali to all but instructed trial judges on how to usurp Batson. In chastising the 
Louisiana Supreme Court for its failure to provide greater insights into its 
assessment of the Batson challenge in Snyder, the majority highlighted the 
fact that the lower court's findings with respect to Brooks, the juror who was 
back struck and the only strike analyzed by the Court, were "simply allowed 
... without explanation."189 Presumably, then "the trial judge's evaluation 
[ would have been] given much deference"190 had the trial judge explained 
his reasons for denying the challenges. But given the deep racial history of 
this case, such an outcome would have worked an injustice. Specifically, it is 
not until one analyzes the context of this case, 191 the actors at play, 192 the 
18 7. See supra Part II. 
188. Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1208 (majority opinion). 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Specifically, one must consider the fact that it occurred in the setting of Jefferson 
Parish. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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racially inflammatory nature of the references to OJ. Simpson at the time, 
and the construction of an all-white jury by striking all black jurors, that one 
is able to realize that the three steps of Batson are easily made out. 
Instead, the majority opinion in Snyder stated somewhat meekly that, 
"when all of these considerations are taken into account [meaning the 
comparative juror analysis of the back-strike of Brooks], the prosecutor's 
proffered justification for striking Brooks is suspicious." 193 Trouble is, the 
Court failed to take all the circumstances into account and thereby rendered 
a curious opinion that lacks the force that a more fully analyzed case would 
have. 
Even if we step back from the racial toxicity of references to the OJ. 
Simpson case, we are still left with a deeply problematic outcome in the 
Snyder case. The intentional manipulation of the jury pool by the 
prosecutors to construct an all-white jury is manifest in any reasoned review 
of the totality of the circumstances of the voir dire. Further, the reasons 
articulated by the prosecutors for this racial homogeneity are not plausible, 
especially when added to the accumulation of insult engendered by the OJ. 
Simpson references. The Supreme Court therefore should have recalled that 
" ... the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our 
criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure 
that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race."194 As 
such, the Sixth Amendment overtones, when combined with the dictates of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, should have properly led the Supreme Court 
to order yet another trial of Snyder. 
Snyder deserves to be punished for his crimes. This determination, 
however, should be made by a jury of his peers that is equitably and fairly 
struck. Should the construction of a jury in the absence of the exercise of 
biased peremptory challenges prove impossible, I would agree with Justice 
Marshall concurring in Batson when he wrote, "The decision today will not 
end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection 
process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory 
challenges entirely"195 and also with Justice Breyer concurring in Miller-El 
when he stated that he "believed it necessary to reconsider Batson's test and 
the peremptory system as a whole."196 It might be time to contemplate 
seriously the elimination of the peremptory challenge, at least insofar as 
death-penalty cases are concerned- justice, it seems, might depend upon it. 
Indeed, this step certainly would not be unprecedented. England, for 
192. It is relevant that Williams twice reneged on his promises to the court that he would 
no longer mention the OJ. Simpson case. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. 
193. Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1209. 
194. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986). 
195. Id. at 102-03 (Marshall,J., concurring). 
196. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266-74 (2005) (Breyer,]., concurring). 
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example, abolished the use of peremptory challenges in 1988. 197 Indeed, the 
controversial prosecutorial behavior in Snyder might have rendered it the 
perfect case in which to revisit the merits of the peremptory challenge, an 
opportunity the Court missed in Mil/,er-El. 198 
The majority in Snyder, however, has provided one glimmer of hope 
about the manner of assessing a Batson challenge. In acknowledging that "in 
other circumstances [the Court has] held that, once it is shown that a 
discriminatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in an action taken 
by a state actor, the burden shifts to the party defending the action to show 
that this factor was not determinative,"199 the Court has left the door open 
for such a causation-driven200 modification of Batson in the future. Justice 
Alito remarked that "while they have not previously applied this standard in 
Batson" in the case before them it was indeed enough "to recognize that a 
peremptory strike shown to have been motivated in substantial part by 
discriminatory intent could not be sustained based upon any lesser showing 
by the prosecution."201 This could indeed signal a modification of Batson 
that would allow for greater accessibility to the remedial force of such a 
challenge through enhanced exploration of prosecutorial motivations. 
Therefore, no matter the direction that the Court decides to follow, it would 
appear that Batson will continue to form a central part of its jurisprudence. 
Batson, it seems, will survive in some form. 
197. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 118 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ 
acts/actsl988/ukpga_l9880033_en_13. The statute provides: 
(I) The right to challenge jurors without cause in proceedings for the trial of a 
person on indictment is abolished. 
(2) In addition and without prejudice to any powers which the Crown Court may 
possess to order the exclusion of the public from any proceedings a judge of the 
Crown Court may order that the hearing of a challenge for cause shall be in 
camera or in chambers. 
Id.; see Sommers & Norton, supra note 145, at 269 (" [E]ven when attorneys consider race during 
jury selection, there is little reason to believe that judicial questioning will produce information 
useful for identifying this bias."). See generally Massaro, supra note 4 (suggesting abolishing the 
government use of peremptory challenges). 
198. This was despite Justice Breyer's lengthy assessment ofperemptories. Miller-El, 545 U.S. 
at 266--74 (Breyer,]., concurring). 
199. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1212 (2008) (emphasis added). 
200. Id. With respect to the assessment of discriminatory motivation.Justice Alito remarked 
that in the Snyder case there was not "any realistic possibility that this subtle question of 
causation could be profitably explored further on remand at this late date, more than a decade 
after petitioner's trial." Id. 
201. Id. 
